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Huntington (1993) argued that religion was to become a central source of global conflicts in the post-Cold War era. Specifically, he perceived much of the international tension to arise from confrontation between Islam and the ‘West’, a term that pointed to predominantly the United States (US) and Europe. All this was wrapped in his scheme of the so-called ‘clash of civilizations’. Huntington envisaged that the US and its European allies would experience hostility from the governments of some Muslim countries, and in some instances there would be violent conflicts between the Muslim societies or groups and non-Muslim ones (Huntington 1998, p. 212).  Although it is simplistic to argue that the Huntingtonian thesis has been vindicated by the September 11, 2001 event, constructivists have taken religious factors into serious account in their analysis of the behavioural patterns of states’ foreign policies, since they perceive ‘the construction of common identities – whether cultural, religious or ethnic – as under-studied elements of international relations which have an important and diffuse impact upon a range of issues’ (Davidson 2004, p. 12). Constructivist theorists such as Alexander Wendt and Stephen Walt believe that religions (Islam and Christianity in particular) are ‘ideational constructs’ which have often been left out from the discussion by leading theories as significant factors to explain developments in international relations. In short, religion has an important role to play in shaping state policies in one way or another, and September 11, 2001 attacks have certainly led to an expansion of the debate on this topic. Under such political and academic circumstances, it becomes even more unthinkable to leave out the factor of religion when discussing foreign policies of Malaysia, where more than 60 percent of the population are Muslims, and Indonesia, which, with more than 86 percent of the population being Muslims, is the largest Muslim society in the world. This paper examines the influence of Islam as a factor shaping the two states’ foreign policies and bilateral relations. 

Governments in Kuala Lumpur and Jakarta certainly do not consult Koran, syariah or hadith when making foreign policy decisions. The factor of Islam, to the extent that it conditions the conduct of foreign policy, is conceptualised as encompassing many aspects such as the size of Muslim population, political influence of Muslim leaders and political parties, reaction of Muslim communities towards Muslim affairs around the world, activities of Muslim non-government organizations and other radical groups, establishment of Muslim institutions (such as banks and insurance companies), and the two states’ involvement in international Muslim organizations such as the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) and Developing Eight Muslim Countries (D8). In the post-colonial era, nations with a significant or majority Muslim population may adopt either a secular or theocratic state identity. In an ideal definition, for a theocratic political entity or Islamic state, Islam would have a more direct influence in the formulation of its foreign policy, acting ‘as a motivator, legitimator or simply a justifier’ (Dawisha 1983, p. 5). Under a secular state identity, Islam would have a more limited influence on the state’s foreign policy. However, such simple categorization does not capture the real dynamics of foreign policy operations, particularly in those Muslim majority countries like Malaysia and Indonesia, where a conjunction of various Islam-related national and international issues, institutions and events has increasingly come to shape the formally secular states’ foreign policies. 

At the beginning of this discussion, I should present two broad observations. First, the growing importance of Islam in Malaysian and Indonesian domestic politics, and reactions from the Muslim communities within these nations to international affairs which concern the Muslim world, have influenced their foreign policies, especially in the post-Cold War era. Second, Malaysia’s active and Indonesia’s more modest roles in championing the global causes of Muslim states and societies have made both countries attractive locations for several radical and extremist Muslim groups to plan and conduct terrorist activities, complicating the bilateral relations. These observations are used in this paper to frame the analysis which looks at the tension between the various competing interest groups and political parties in constructing the state identity, and the dilemma in the formulation and implementation of foreign policy. Thus, the first section analyses Islam in the context of Malaysian domestic politics, and the manner in which Islam has been incorporated into foreign policy, particularly during the Mahathir Mohamad administration. Following the same approach, the second section examines the changing roles of Islam in Indonesian domestic politics, and its influence on foreign policy, especially during the Suharto administration. Partly based on the information presented in the first and second sections, the third section discusses Malaysian and Indonesian relations in light of the presence of extremist Islamic groups and the threat of terrorism.

Islam in Malaysian politics and foreign policy	

The sentiments and political aspirations of the Malay-Muslim community, coupled with dynamic international events, have long conditioned the thinking and practice of Malaysian foreign policy. Discussion in this section follows a chronological order. It first briefly presents Islam in the local political context prior to national independence. The subsequent subsections discuss the religion’s impact in the domestic politics and foreign policy during the Cold War period, the post-Cold War era until the resignation of Mahathir in 2003, and the post-Mahathir phase.  

The Islamic factor before independence

The political influence of Islam in Malaya emerged during the 1920s and 1930s, particularly seen in the rivalry between the reformist and the traditionalist Malay-Muslims over the modernization and reform of the Malay community. The reformist movement was spearheaded by the Youth Group (Kaum Muda) which sought to modernize the Malay-Muslim community by adopting a reformed interpretation of the Quran and Sunnah (meaning established customs and normative precedents in Islam based on the example of the Prophet Muhammad). They promoted new religious studies and Western education, criticized the incompetence of the royal courts and their religious administration, and campaigned to raise anti-colonial sentiment (Funston 2006, p. 53). Many of the leaders of the Youth Group were influenced by the writings of Muslim political activists in the Middle East (including Hassan Al-Bana, Jamaludin al-Afghani and Muhammad Abduh), as well as the independence of Egypt and Iraq from the British in 1922 and 1932 respectively. In contrast, the Elder Group (Kaum Tua), which represented the views of the traditional ulama (or religious teachers) and the officials in the Sultans’ palaces, wanted to preserve the power of the old Malay elites and the royal court. The Elder Group believed that modernization and liberalization would threaten both the established social foundations of Malay community and the sanctity of Islam. 

In the context of party politics, United Malays National Organization (UMNO), founded in 1946, was challenged by conservative religious groups which did not trust the organization’s secular officials under Tunku’s leadership. This ultimately led to the defection in 1951 of a group of more religious UMNO members who formed a new party known as Pan-Malayan Islamic Party (PMIP), which later evolved to the Islamic Party of Malaysia (Parti Islam se Malaysia) or PAS. This split culminated in the political situation in which UMNO played the role as a more secular and moderate Islamic party, whilst PAS’ outlook was  more ‘conservative’ and traditionalist. In the lead up to national independence PAS overtly professed the goal of creating an Islamic rules-based society and making Malaya an Islamic state. The end result of the negotiations and compromises among the political elites representing major ethnic groups produced less than that. Malays and Islam were specially protected in the 1957 Malayan Constitution, which also respected ethno-religious pluralism and was later used as the basis for the Malaysian Constitution. Echoing the former’s spirit, the latter document stipulates, under Article 3(1), that ‘Islam is the religion of the Federation; but other religions may be practiced in peace and harmony in any part of the Federation’ (Verma 2002, p. 96). Article 3(1) is important because it gives the Malaysian government the legal right to provide public funds for the establishment and maintenance of Islamic institutions and support their activities. One example of these activities is the Musabaqah Tilawah Al-Quran (Koran recital competition) which takes place at the state, national and international levels. On the other hand, by guaranteeing the non-Islamic religions to be practiced freely alongside the ‘official religion’, the Constitution clearly ensured a secular state (Funston 2006, p. 54). The Constitutional stipulation of the syariah law can also be viewed in the same light. According to the Constitution, only Malays are subject to syariah law, but Malays can also be subject to civil law. This opens up space for political manipulation (as seen in the sodomy case of Anwar Ibrahim). The federal government does not have the power to impose the syariah law since it lies in the hands of the individual state governments, which implement their own various forms of that law. In any case, syariah law in Malaysia is different from those practiced in Saudi Arabia or Pakistan. The Malaysian version does not include criminal law (hudud) of Islam which involves ‘harsh’ punishment such as amputation of limbs for theft and whipping of one hundred stripes for illicit intercourse by a person with unmarried person.​[1]​ Syariah law in Malaysia mainly deals with issues in relation to marriage and family. So far only Kelantan state government has approved hudud as part of its syariah law, however the federal government has tried to stop its implementation by citing the relevant federal-state relations laws.

The Islamic factor in the Cold War period

The constitutional salience of Islam, without the creation of an Islamic state, exacerbated the struggle between PAS and the ruling UMNO to win the Malay votes over which party best represented the ‘true’ Islam and more effectively fought for the interest of the Muslim ummah (community). PAS typically accused UMNO of not presiding over an ‘authentic’ Islamic government. As a result of the growing challenge from PAS, the UMNO-led government established in 1969 a National Council of Islamic Affairs under the Prime Minister’s Department (Funston 1980, p. 215). During election campaigns, PAS routinely urged the Malay-Muslim voters to use their votes as a jihad against UMNO (Verma 2002, p. 107). For its part, UMNO often accused PAS of having a radical or even ‘extremist’ outlook. UMNO also singled out the weakness of PAS in cooperating with non-Malay political parties, in order to demonstrate that only UMNO could represent Malays in a multicultural society like Malaysia. The non-Malays and their political parties, such as the Democratic Action Party (DAP), were indeed reluctant to co-operate with PAS because of its declared goal to make Malaysia an Islamic state. The racial riots in 1969 seemed to bring about some change in the Malay politics. The Abdul Razak Husin government called for greater Malay unity and expressed strong commitment to place Islam at the centre of national development. This was boosted with the incorporation of PAS into the National Front (BN). Alliance was broken in 1977 after a bitter power struggle between PAS and UMNO in the state of Kelantan. 

New forces came to further complicate the region-politics nexus. The global Islamic resurgence, especially the events of the Iranian Revolution in the late 1970s, had a significant impact on Malays. The dakwah movement (or missionary activities) began to grow in the 1970s, especially among the Malay youth and Muslim organizations (such as the Malaysian Islamic Youth Movement-ABIM, Darul Arqam and Jemaat Tabligh) which shared the ambition to establish a community based on Islamic teachings (Nair 1997, pp. 29-30). ABIM became one of the Malaysian government’s staunchest critics, especially under its founding leader Anwar Ibrahim, on issues of corruption, Malay poverty, abuse of power and the poor state of the Islamic education system. Meanwhile, throughout the first decade of the Mahathir administration, UMNO and PAS continued to compete to demonstrate to their constituents their ‘Islamic credentials’. In September 1982, at UMNO’s 33rd General Assembly, Mahathir proclaimed that ‘the struggle is to change the attitude of the Malays in line with the requirements of Islam in this modern age’ (Martinez 2004, p. 28). Still, his government strengthened its Muslim support base by establishing the Islamic Teachers Training College, International Islamic University Malaysia, the Islamic Bank of Malaysia, the Islamic Development Foundation, the Malaysian Islamic Insurance Company (TAKAFUL), and promoted Islamic education in the secular school system (Nair 1997, p. 34). In addition, the government also introduced daily broadcasts of azan (call for prayer) on national television and radio (Verma 2002, p. 108). Mahathir succeeded in co-opting Anwar to join UMNO in 1982 and installed him as Deputy Minister of the Religious Affairs Section of the Prime Minister’s office. On the other hand, PAS also endeavoured to raise its Islamic profile and succeeded in recruiting other leaders of ABIM, such as Fadzil Noor and Hadi Awang. At the PAS General Assembly in 1982, a resolution was passed to democratize the party by opening its door to Muslims of all races and non-Muslims. Thus, PAS moved from being an exclusively ethnic Malay organization to a more pan-Islamic organization. 

The importance of Islam in domestic politics, especially through the competition of the two leading Muslim political parties UMNO and PAS, inevitably influenced the outlook of the Malaysian foreign policy. However, the actual policy also factored in the Malays’ reaction towards the international issues confronting the Muslim world. During the Cold War, the Israel-Palestine conflict was always an important issue for the Malay community and a stumbling block to opening bilateral relations with Israel. For instance in 1959 Moshe Yuval, the then Israeli envoy to Australia, had a conversation with Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman concerning the opening of diplomatic relations, during the latter’s visit to Australia. Tunku responded that, ‘[t]he leadership of Malaya knows the character of Israel very well, but the Muslim masses in our country oppose you. Therefore, we cannot establish diplomatic relations with you’ (Yegar 2006, p. 2). Tunku’s government in fact appreciated Israel for being the second country to support Malaya membership in the United Nations (UN) and was willing to recognise Israel, but could not proceed to open diplomatic relations for fear of political backlash from the Malay-Muslim community. Their votes were crucial to UMNO during the 1959 general election, first after independence. At the same time, the Arab countries, especially Egypt and Saudi Arabia, were also pressuring Malaya not to establish diplomatic relations with Israel.  

The plight of Palestinians in the Israeli occupied territories in general, and the burning of the Al Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem in 1969 in particular, were major concerns for Malay-Muslims as they entertained a strong sense of solidarity with people from the same religion.​[2]​ This drove the Malaysian government’s moves to demonstrate Muslim solidarity in relation to these issues. Malay political parties like UMNO and PAS, in addition to Muslim non-government organizations such as ABIM, continuously protested the aggression committed by the Israeli government towards the Palestinians in the occupied territories of West Bank and Gaza. In the 1978 general election, PAS introduced a manifesto calling for unity among the Muslim community worldwide, greater regional security in the Middle East, and a UN resolution to the Palestinian issue. It also condemned the Camp David Accords (Nair 1997, p. 73). The manifesto clearly showed PAS’s expanding interest in foreign policy issues. Meanwhile, the UMNO-led government became known as a strong supporter in Southeast Asia for the struggle of the Palestinian people. For instance, as early as 1969, it already allowed the Fatah movement, led by Yasser Arafat, to open an office in Kuala Lumpur (Dhillon 2003, p. 339). Moreover, the Malay-Muslims were particularly angered by the massacre of hundreds of Palestinian women and children by the Lebanese Christian Phalangist militias in refugee camps in Sabra and Shatila after Lebanon was invaded by Israel in June of 1982. Many Muslim non-governmental organizations and members of political parties demonstrated in front of the US Embassy in Kuala Lumpur (because the US was seen as an unwavering ally of Israel) and burned the Israeli flag. The incident was broadcast repeatedly in the government controlled television channels to mobilize the local Muslim solidarity. Demonstrations were also staged by the Muslim youth wing of both UMNO and PAS in front of the Singapore Embassy in Kuala Lumpur in November 1986, when the then Prime Minister Lee Kwan Yew was hosting the visit of Israeli President Chaim Herzog. Despite not attending any of the protest rallies, Anwar Ibrahim, in his capacity as UMNO youth leader, accused ‘some foreign countries’ of attempting to undermine the Mahathir administration due to its strong support of the PLO (Nair 1997, p. 226). 

Under those circumstances, Malaysia was keen to play an active role in OIC and foster good relations with the Arab countries. The idea of an international Islamic inter-governmental organization was initially suggested by Tunku when he attended a British Commonwealth meeting in London in 1961, when he proposed that Muslim countries should establish an ‘Islamic Commonwealth’. While his idea was not well received by many Muslim countries, it was indicative of a clear vision of engagement and co-operation between the Muslim countries (Abu Bakar 1990, p. 80). The general mood changed in 1969, when the Muslim world began to be concerned about their future after the loss of the Arab nations during the Arab-Isreali war and the burning of Al Aqsa mosque. Tunku seized the moment and called for a meeting of governments from 23 Muslim countries in Kuala Lumpur. This kicked off a series of gatherings which led to the establishment of OIC in 1970 and Tunku’s selection as the organization’s first Secretary General. Under his leadership, OIC founded the Islamic Development Bank (intended to provide financial support for the especially impoverished Muslim nations) and the International Islamic News Agency (to act as the voice of the Muslim world). 

Islamic solidarity and business collaboration reinforced each other. For instance, Malaysia’s close relationship with many Arab countries saw Saudi Arabia, in particular, providing financial assistance to Malaysia. Loans from Saudi Arabia aided the Abdul Razak Husin administration in carrying out infrastructure development in the Malay-Muslim heartlands of Kedah, Kelantan and Terengganu states under the New Economic Policy (NEP). Also during Razak’s prime ministership, the Kuwaiti government, through a ‘Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development’, agreed to invest in Malaysian projects under the Second Malaysian Plan (1971-1975). The Kuwait National Petroleum Corporation (KNPC) also signed an agreement to co-operate with Malaysia’s national oil company PETRONAS (Ministry of Foreign Affairs Malaysia 1975, pp. 7-8). Favourable relations with the Arab countries also saw a sharp increase in trade with Malaysia, from 172 million ringgit in 1969 to 654 million ringgit in 1974 (Nair 1997, p. 62). Since then, the Malaysian government has been keen to further develop economic relations with the Arab World.  

The Mahathir government in the post-Cold War era

While Mahathir fought against the conservative Muslims for a modern understanding of Islam on the domestic front, he also ran a pro-Islamic foreign policy and campaigned for the world’s Muslim causes during this period. Throughout the 1990s, there were many instances in which the Mahathir government clashed with the ulama over their narrow interpretations of Islamic law and the ideal form of a Muslim-governed state. His deputy Anwar Ibrahim seemed to share his modern liberal understanding of Islam. Anwar Ibrahim argued that maintaining economic growth, reducing poverty and improving the welfare of women and children were far more important than spending time debating ‘the nature and institutions of the ideal Islamic state’ or ‘amputating the limbs of thieves’ (Ibrahim 1996, p. 114). The ulama’s conservative interpretation of Islam in several states led to the banning of Muslim women from beauty contests, and Muslim men from body building competitions. Mahathir criticized the ulama and the state Islamic authorities for dwelling on form rather than substance. For example he urged that rather than banning beauty and body building contests they should concentrate on how to increase the understanding of Islam in the multicultural community and to improve Islamic education. These views offended several state Islamic clerics (mufti) including the mufti of the state of Selangor, who accused Mahathir of being an apostate (Chin 1998, pp. 184-185). Mahathir responded by proposing that the administration of Islamic laws should be centralized, rather than maintained as the independent jurisdiction of individual states. He warned that a ‘narrow interpretation of Islam’ would jeopardize the country’s economic development and the Vision 2020 (Chin 1998, p. 185).

In the November 1999 general election, UMNO’s Islamic credentials were sorely tested when at least half of the Malay votes went to PAS and a newly formed multi-ethnic party the Justice Party (KeAdilan), which was led by Wan Azizah Wan Ismail and formed after the Deputy Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim was unceremoniously sacked by Mahathir under the allegations of corruption and sodomy.​[3]​ The beating and humiliation Anwar Ibrahim suffered while in police custody and detention under ISA triggered widespread protest because many considered such behaviour as violating the moral principle of Malay culture. Anwar Ibrahim’s inhumane treatment became a major factor causing the Malay voters to show their dissatisfaction towards Mahathir and UMNO (Funston 2004, p. 171). In addition, Anwar Ibrahim’s trial took place in a civil rather than syariah court, which was for cases of sodomy highly unusual.​[4]​ Verma (2002, pp. 109-110) has posited that when Anwar Ibrahim was sacked by Mahathir, ‘UMNO lost its claim to being Islamic, and the state lost its legitimacy in addressing the spiritual needs of its Malay constituency’. Furthermore, many Malay voters were also attracted to the sentiment of reformasi (reformation) against the ruling government. The notion of reformasi, which was developed in Indonesia and united the protestors in their campaign to bring down the Suharto regime, was appropriated as a rallying call by Anwar Ibrahim and his supporters, and promoted by the Justice Party. UMNO was soundly defeated by PAS in the Malay-Muslim heartland states of Kelantan and Terengganu, a result which led to a significant loss of seats in the Federal Parliament (from 93 to 71). In this context, rivalry between UMNO and PAS intensified. In order to regain the confidence from the Malay community, Mahathir sought to more publicly show his embracing of Islamic values. Indeed, in 2001, when PAS leaders challenged him to openly declare that Malaysia was an Islamic state, Mahathir obliged. This political gesturing received less than enthusiastic responses from the Chinese and Indian partners in the multi-racial BN coalition, and strong protest from the opposition parties especially the DAP which called the declaration unconstitutional.​[5]​

Conjunction of domestic political scenes and complex international relations galvanized the Mahathir government to become pro-active in relation to the issues that affected the Muslim world in the post-Cold War era. Conflicts between Muslim states and their impact on Malaysia’s political landscape created new diplomatic challenges for Kuala Lumpur. One example was Malaysia’s approach to the first Gulf War. In 1990-1991, as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council, Malaysia voted in favour of Resolution 678 which endorsed the use of force against Iraq in order to free Kuwait. However, as the war progressed, Malaysia distanced itself from the resolution because of the US-led coalition forces’ excessive use of force against Iraq (Yaakub 2004, p. 33). At first, Mahathir had sought to justify to the international community and the domestic public Malaysia’s support for Resolution 678 by condemning the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, proclaiming the invasion contravened the teaching of Islam itself (Nair 1997, p. 244). However, the excessive use of force by the coalition forces, under the banner of the UN, put Malaysia in a dilemma. An estimated 200,000 Iraqi forces and 150,000 civilians were reported to have been killed, whilst massive destruction was inflicted on Iraqi infrastructure, sparking wide-spread international condemnation (McMahan & McKim 1993). Two of the Malay-Muslim opposition parties, PAS and the Spirit of 46 (Semangat 46) as well as other Islamic organizations such as ABIM, staged demonstrations to protest against the coalition forces. PAS insisted that the Gulf issues should be resolved by the Arab and Muslim countries alone. Mounting pressure from the Muslim groups forced the Mahathir government to issue a statement to the effect that Resolution 678 did not give the US-led forces the right to destroy Iraq, but merely to free Kuwait (Fan Yew Teng 1991, p. 13). From this point onwards, Malaysia began to be more critical of the Gulf War and the motives of the US.  

On another front, Malaysia was very concerned about the suffering of the Bosnian Muslims and ethnic cleansing perpetrated by the Serbian nationalists. Since 1992, Malaysia and several OIC member states had tried to pressure the UN Security Council, Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and the British Commonwealth to take action to protect the Bosnian Muslims, but with very little success. Strong reactions from the Malay community pushed the Mahathir government to accept more than 300 Bosnian refugees into the country in December 1992, mainly women and children. The number kept growing as the conflict worsened. Mahathir justified this and his strong condemnations of the Serb brutalities by declaring that Malaysia’s stance was not solely driven by the sentiment of co-religionism, but also by what was clearly a severe violation of human rights. However, many Malay community organizations urged UMNO and the government to take more concrete actions to help the Bosnian Muslims. Newspapers set up the ‘Bosnian Fund’, whilst Muslim non-governmental organizations established the Bosnia Action Front, an organization which lobbied the government and international community to look for solution to the deteriorating situation in the Balkans. At the height of the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina, reportedly between 500 to 3,000 Malaysian Muslim volunteers were fighting with the local Muslims against the Serbian forces in Bihac, Mostar and Sarajevo, as part of the Seventh Islamic Brigade militia forces (Nair 1997, pp. 255-256).  For his part, Mahathir declared that his government would sell weapons to the Bosnian Muslim forces, and dared the West to impose sanctions on Malaysia for that. Although he did not follow through with this rhetoric, his effort to strengthen Muslim solidarity translated into Malaysia’s very active roles in the UN peace-keeping mission. By March 1995, Malaysia had sent 1,512 troops to Bosnia under the UN banner (Dhillon 2005, p. 365). 

After the 1997 financial crisis struck the region, the Islamic factor in Malaysia’s foreign policy took another turn. Some of Mahathir’s anti-Western outbursts have already become legendary, such as his allegation that the crisis was caused by conspiratorial Western speculators such as the American Jewish financier George Soros who were determined to bring down the thriving economies of the developing countries, particularly the Muslim countries. At a more serious policy level, Malaysia proposed to protect and strengthen economic cooperation between the Muslim countries through using the gold dinar. The crisis taught Malaysia that international currency speculators had the power to attack and devalue a country’s currency at any time. Thus, Malaysia suggested the use of gold dinar instead of paper currency in trade among the Muslim countries (Sheikh Mohd Salleh 2002). There were two reasons for this approach. First, it was a ‘stable currency’ as it had intrinsic value that reduced fluctuation and speculation. Second, it would assist in fostering pan-Islamic brotherhood and unity. In 2003 Mahathir hinted that Malaysia would start using the gold dinar in bilateral trade with Iran. Although the succeeding Abdullah government shelved the idea, the PAS-led state government in Kelantan took over Mahathir’s initiative and introduced the state gold dinar as a substitute for paper currency.     

Developments associated with the September 11, 2001 event and the US-led ‘War on Terror’ meant that events in international relations imposed an Islam-related agenda on Malaysia’s foreign policy with an unprecedented force. This time, however, the task was no longer just to seek and strengthen Muslim solidarity, because a tangible threat to Malaysia itself from extreme Islamists both at home and broad became a serious concern. Issues of how to respond to international events, manage domestic political rivalry and domestic repercussions from global developments, and prevent terrorist threat combined to challenge the Mahathir government, imposing a far more complicated and stressful context on the government’s attempt to display Islamic credentials while promoting a modernist vision of Islamic society for love or money.  

The Mahathir government adopted a critical and analytical approach on the global debate on terrorism. It was instrumental in countering the international backlash against Muslims, in particular the increasing identification of Islam with terrorism in the Western countries. Kuala Lumpur took the initiative to host a special session of the Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers (ICFM) in April 2002 which discussed the various issues relating to global terrorism, including how to differentiate terrorists from freedom fighters (Mohamad 2003, p. 64). Mahathir felt that the most effective way to prevent terrorism was to address its root causes, and in his opinion ‘the principal cause is the Palestinian issue’ (Mohamad 2003, p. 13). He strongly argued that Muslims were angry and disillusioned with the West, especially the US, because of their support for Israel and their reluctance and inability to assist the Palestinians. The Malaysian government had always reiterated that it would recognize Israel provided there was a comprehensive peace agreement reached between the Palestinian authorities and Israel which would eventually lead to the establishment of an independent state of Palestine.​[6]​ Kuala Lumpur maintained its support for the PLO and active participation in the OIC deliberations on the Palestinian issues. 

Although the Malaysian government was one of the first to lend in-principle support to the US ‘War on Terror’, its enthusiasm began to wane when Afghanistan was attacked by the US-led coalition forces. Kuala Lumpur protested the invasion, though falling short of condemning it. PAS leaders, on the other hand, took a more radical stance by calling on Malay-Muslim youth to wage jihad in Afghanistan (Case & Liew Chin-Tong 2006, p. 390). In fact it was understood that some Malay-Muslims including a number of PAS members were training and fighting alongside the Mujahedeen during the Soviet occupation and later the Al-Qaeda-supported Taliban government. Having returned to Malaysia after the collapse of the Taliban government, these people set up the Malaysian Mujahedeen Group (KMM), a militant group which worked with JI at a regional level and declared its goal to overthrow the Malaysian government. 

Activities of home-based extremist groups in collaboration with other militant Islamic organisations in Southeast Asia brought home the terrorist threat, adding a new dire dimension to Kuala Lumpur’s ‘pro-Islamic foreign policy’. The government took steps to crack down on KMM by arresting ten of its most prominent leaders under ISA, including Nik Adli Nik Aziz, the son of the PAS leader, Nik Aziz Nik Mat, accusing them of seeking to ‘topple the government through an armed struggle and replace it with a pure Islamic state based on Quran and Sunnah comprising Indonesia, Mindanao and Malaysia’ (Stewart 2003, p. 228).  While arresting people suspected of being members of the alleged terrorist organizations, the Mahathir government was able to capitalize on the issue by calling on Malaysians to reject the ‘religious extremism’ espoused by the opposition party PAS as well as KMM and various other militant groups.

Transnational terrorism also twisted the Malaysian government’s relations with the Indonesian authorities, forcing cooperation and causing mutual blames, considering the inevitability of networking of Islamist organizations between the two serumpun​[7]​ societies. Several Malaysians, such as Dr Azhari Husin​[8]​ and Nordin Mat Top, were recruited by JI and eventually became involved in the bombings in Indonesia. The bombings in Bali, the J.W. Marriot hotel and the Australian Embassy in Jakarta were believed to be masterminded by Dr Azhari and Nordin and carried out by Indonesians members of JI (Liddle & Mujani 2005, p. 126). Malaysia sought cooperation from ASEAN member states, especially Indonesia, to combat regional terrorism. In January 2002, Abu Jibril (alias Mohammed Iqbal Abdurrahman), an Indonesian citizen who acted as the spiritual leader of KMM, and alleged head of training for Al-Qaeda in Southeast Asia, was detained by the Malaysian authorities and extradited to Indonesia (Chalk 2005, p. 28). 

It seemed that Malaysia had over the years become a favorite ground for transnational militant Islamist groups and activists to liaise and plot their joint activities. Though acting across the region and orchestrated predominantly by Indonesians, both JI and Mujahidin Coalition (Rabitatul Mujahidin), aspiring to establishing Darul Islam (Abode of Islam), were founded in Malaysia. Based on an official statement released by JI in October 2006, the organization was founded on 1 January 1993 in Malaysia by two Indonesian citizens, Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Basyir, both in self-exile in the country (Fealy 2006, p. 362). They were known to have resided in Malaysia during 1985-1998 as religious teachers, before returning to Indonesia after the collapse of the Suharto regime. Basyir also instigated the establishment of the Mujahidin Coalition in Kuala Lumpur in 1999. This organization sought to unite all militant Islamic groups in the region, with a goal to create an Islamic Archipelago (Daulah Islamiah Nusantara). A gathering in Kuala Lumpur that year which led to the establishment of the loose organization was participated by a whole range of militant Islamic groups, including: Laskar Jundullah, Darul Islam, GAM​[9]​, and Republic Islam Aceh from Indonesia; the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) from the southern Philippines; the Rohingya Solidarity Organization (RSO) and Rohingya National Organization (RNO) from Myanmar; the Patani United Liberation Organization (PULO) from southern Thailand; and Malaysia’s own KMM (Emmers & Sebastian 2005, p. 158). Moreover, it was reported that part of the discussions on the September 11, 2001 plot by the international terrorists was held in Malaysia. The then Malaysian Chief of Police, Norian Mai, alleged that thirteen members of KMM were arrested under the ISA because they were suspected of having links to Zacharias Moussaoui, a French citizen involved in the planning of the September 11, 2001 attacks. Moussaoui, the so-called ‘twentieth hijacker’, was known to have visited Malaysia several times. Khalid al-Midhar and Nawaf al-Hazmi, two of the hijackers who perished in the September 11, 2001 attacks, were confirmed by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and Malaysian immigration authorities to have visited Malaysia in November 2000 to meet Moussaoui (Stewart 2003, p. 229; Chalk 2005, p. 24). 





The Abdullah Ahmad Badawi (Abdullah) government was a strong supporter for regional counter-terrorism arrangements. For instance in July 2004 it took the initiative in establishing the Southeast Asian Regional Centre for Counter-Terrorism (SEARCCT) in Putrajaya (more about this scheme later).  However, a more prominent and meaningful phenomenon so far as the Islamic factor in Malaysia’s foreign policy was concerned during the Abdullah government was Abdullah’s personal efforts, while Malaysia held the chairmanship of OIC (October 2003- March 2008), to influence the global debate on Islam. Abdullah tried to correct the West’s negative image of Islam as a religion that espoused terrorism. He did this by engaging in dialogue with Western leaders and regional organizations such as the EU; and by supporting inter-faith conferences and participating in global counter-terrorism discussions. Abdullah emphasized in his speech at the 2006 UN General Assembly that as part of the Western world’s misunderstanding of the nature of Islam, jihad, terrorism and Islam had been wrongly associated. Meanwhile, he also persuaded many Muslim leaders and religious’ scholars to condemn radical militant groups’ interpretation of Islam, especially the notion that an act of terrorism through suicide bombing was an act of jihad. ​[10]​

Abdullah’s background, which was more religious than his predecessors’, added to his credibility as a leading spokesperson for the Muslim world. He grew up in a pious family and graduated in Islamic Studies from the University of Malaya. Abdullah’s appointment as Prime Minister was partly intended to disempower radical Muslim organizations and PAS which, capitalizing on the Anwar Ibrahim saga, had been accusing the government of being anti-Islamic, obstructing the implementation of syariah as well as being corrupt. Soon after taking office in October 2003, Abdullah picked up Mahathir’s rhetoric that Malaysia was an Islamic state but would follow a progressive Islam. Abdullah’s version of progressive Islam was the concept of Islam Hadhari, which tried to more systematically and intellectually demonstrate that quest for material progress, economic development and nationalism did not contradict the teachings of Islam. The aim of the project was to promote unity and harmony within the Malay community and in their interactions with non-Malays (Liow 2005b, p. 919). Islam Hadhari was successfully used by Abdullah and UMNO in the campaigns during the 2004 general election and helped the BN win with a landslide. 
	
Abdullah not only promoted the idea of Islam Hadhari within Malaysia, but also at the international forums. The idea was elaborately utilized in his engagement in the global debate on Islam. There were two reasons as to why Abdullah was keen to promoting Islam Hadhari internationally. Firstly, he wanted to improve the image and reputation of Islamic countries in general which suffered in light of global terrorism, by articulating a moderate theory and practice of Islam. Secondly, Abdullah was enthusiastic about promoting Malaysia to Islamic countries ‘as a model of modernity and religious pluralism’ (Derichs 2006, p. 173).  Using Malaysia’s status as OIC’s chair, the Abdullah government campaigned for the organization’s reform, and the promotion of Islam Hadhari was an important element in this campaign. Malaysia was instrumental in persuading the OIC to incorporate the concept into the work of its restructured secretariat so that the new secretariat included departments for developing Islamic thought and inter faith dialogue as well as mechanisms for conflict prevention and resolution, trade and investment, among member states, and general peace and security issues. Amendments to the charter also included a common vision for a moderate Islam, the issuing of united fatwa (Islamic legal opinion), and a membership subscription calculated at 0.01 percent of Gross Domestic Product so that the secretariat would have adequate financial resources. While Malaysia contributed to those various reforms of OIC during its chairmanship in order to make OIC function more effectively in building solidarity among the Muslim countries, the organization’s formal recognition of the Islam Hadhari concept was one of its most significant contributions. Abdullah step down as prime minister in favour of his successor Najib Abdul Razak on April 3, 2009 after the National Front lost two-thirds majority in the parliament in the 2008 parliamentary election. Najib had a more liberal and moderate outlook on Islam.

Resurgence of Islam and the Indonesian foreign policy

This section analyses developments in four phases, which is somewhat similar to the periodization in the Malaysia case due to broadly common trajectories in their respective political and international politics. Thus the first phase is the lead up to national independence, a period when Islamic leaders had some influence in domestic politics but their goals were hijacked by the Indonesian nationalist leaders. The second phase is the Cold War period, when Indonesia adopted Pancasila as the state ideology and ‘independent and active’ principle as the basis for foreign policy. During the Sukarno era Islam was not considered to be a major factor in foreign policy. Similarly, during the first two decades of President Suharto, the activities of Islamic political parties​[11]​ were restricted, and there was little sign of Islamic influence in the New Order regime’s foreign policy. The third phase extends from the end of the Cold War to the fall of the Suharto regime, when the influence of Islam grew stronger as Suharto sought political support from Muslims. Suharto also began to promote an Islamic identity and a pro-Islamic foreign policy through his involvement in the OIC, Palestine and Bosnia. The final phase is the post-Suharto era, when Islamic political parties grew in strength and, under the so-called Poros Tengah (or Central Axis), managed to elect Abdurrahman Wahid (Gus Dur) as Indonesia’s fourth President. Islam’s influence in Indonesian foreign policy in the post-Suharto era has fluctuated due to the more democratically elected leaders having to walk a fine line trying to balance domestic pressure for a more active diplomacy in the affairs of the Muslim World on one hand, and maintaining good relations with the West – from which came financial aid – on the other. The end result was a modest role played by Indonesia – modest compared to Malaysia’s – in championing the causes of the Muslim world. 

The Islamic factor and national independence

During the Dutch colonial rule, the clash between Kaum Muda (Youth Group) and Kaum Tua (Elders Group) started in West Sumatra among the ethnic Minangkabau as early as 19th century. The Youth Group was made up of many young scholars who studied Islam in the Middle East, had performed hajj to Mecca and was influenced by the Wahabbi school of Islam in Saudi Arabia. They sought to purify Islam of its un-Islamic practices such as gambling, drinking alcohol, opium using, cockfighting and the Minangkabau matrilineal customs (Machmudi 2008, p. 59). The Elders Group wanted to preserve the old pre-Islamic practices and traditions. Therefore, the Elders Group sought the Dutch assistance to fight the Youth Group that was under the leadership of Imam Bonjol. As such, the Padri Wars (1821-1837) resulted from the clash between the Youth Group and the Elders Group with the help from the Dutch forces. At the end, the Youth Group was defeated and Imam Bonjol was captured and exiled to Cianjur in West Java (Machmudi 2008, p. 59). He was later transferred to Manado in Sulawesi where he died in 1864. 

There were two influential Muslim organizations established during the Dutch colonial rule namely; Muhammadiayah (1912) and Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) (1926). The Muhammadiyah group had a modernist approach in the sense that they sought to reform the Muslim identity in Indonesia which it perceived as being ‘backward and traditional’. In contrast, the NU was more ‘traditional’ in outlook and worked to maintain the power of the religious leaders (kiyais). This group also considered modernization to be a direct challenge to the existing Indonesian way of life. The division between these two groups hampered the establishment of a united Islamic force to challenge the colonial power. 

During the Japanese occupation of Netherlands East Indies, the Japanese authorities established the Indonesian Muslim Consultative Council (Masyumi) in 1943 because they considered Islam to be an important medium through which they could propagate their own war time ideology. This saw the Muhammadiyah and NU work together in one organization. In the lead up to independence in 1945, conflict erupted among the 62 committee members of the BPUPKI (a Japanese-organized committee for granting independence to Indonesia), especially between the Islamic (represented mainly by the Muhammadiyah – led by Ki Bagus Hadikusomo and NU – led by Wahid Hasyim) and secular nationalist groups. Under the circumstances, despite their differences the Islamic groups were pushing for the independent Indonesia to be an Islamic state, though they had various definitions for its system, whilst the nationalists were demanding separation of state and religion (Sukma 2003, p. 19). To solve the deadlock, an agreement was forged between the two groups to set up a ‘Committee of Nine’​[12]​ which later agreed to accept Pancasila with a provision, after the first principle of ‘Belief in God’, for the inclusion of syariah law for Muslims, and a decree stating that only a Muslim was eligible to be elected as President (Hosen 2007, pp. 61-62; Sukma 2003, p. 19; Elson 2009, p. 118). However, it fell short of declaring Indonesia as an Islamic state. This settlement was known as the Jakarta Charter. The fact that both leaders Ki Bagus Hadikusomo and Wahid Hasyim were consulted and agreed to the settlement proved that Muhammadiyah and NU supported the Jakarta Charter.​[13]​  

Immediately after President Sukarno (his real name Kusno Sosrodihardjo) proclaimed independence, Vice President Mohammad Hatta announced that due to reservations from Protestant and Catholic leaders, and for the sake of national unity, the initially proposed provision and decree would be removed from the Constitution (Hosen 2007, p. 62; Sukma 2003, p. 19). This was a major blow to Muhammadiyah and NU, which interpreted this act as a sign of betrayal by Sukarno and Hatta. In 1945, the apolitical Masyumi, which comprised of Muhammadiyah, NU and some small Islamic organizations, was transformed into a political party. However, the Muslim leaders in Masyumi, because of the on-going armed conflict with the Dutch, postponed their protest activities against the Republican government. Nevertheless, a few Muslim groups, especially the Darul Islam movement in Aceh, West Java, South Sulawesi, revolted against the Republican government as they wanted to create an Islamic state (Azra 2004, p. 137). These rebellions were crushed by the Republican army. 

Islam in Indonesian politics and foreign policy during the Cold War

Political struggle between the secular nationalists and conservative Islamic forces continued after independence was fully achieved in 1949 after the ousting of the Dutch. At the beginning the government’s position was strengthened by the fact that the unity between the Muhammadiyah and NU in the framework of the Masyumi party was short lived because of an internal power struggle. In 1952, the NU split from the Masyumi party as its leaders felt that the NU was being marginalized (Fealy, Hooker & White 2006, p. 45). In the first general election in 1955, such disunity led to a loss of support from the Indonesian Muslims. The Masyumi and NU gained only 20.9 percent and 18.4 percent of the votes respectively. Rivalry between Islamic political parties drove many Indonesian Muslims to give their support to either the leftist or nationalist parties. 

Sukarno introduced a new political system called euphemistically Guided Democracy in 1959, with the support of the nationalists and the ‘dual function’ army.  This personalized authoritarian regime was meant to be based on the Indonesian village concept of ‘discussions and consensus’. The Guided Democracy government consisted of representatives from the nationalists, the army, Islamist and communist groups. Sukarno also introduced the doctrine of NASAKOM​[14]​ in order to conciliate the competing political aspirations of those forces. Nevertheless, Sukarno leaned more towards leftist and communist groups, and in fact arrested many leaders of the Masyumi Party for opposing him. He finally banned the two major Islamic political parties, Masyumi and the Indonesian Islamic League Party (Partai Serikat Islam) accused of supporting rebels of the PRRI/Permesta in Sumatra and South Sulawesi and Darul Islam movement in West Java. 

Sukarno’s distrust of the Islamic groups and political parties was reflected in his foreign policy. At the beginning of national independence, the principle of ‘independent and active’ foreign policy was adopted. This principle worked to effectively exclude Islam as a factor in foreign policy. For instance, Sukarno’s declaration of Confrontation against Malaysia demonstrated that little consideration was given to either a shared religion or the serumpun Malay race. Neither did the President give priority to Indonesia’s relationship with the Muslim and Arab world. Sukarno placed a greater emphasis on building close relationships with the Western countries (especially the US) and later an alliance with the Communist bloc.   

The army gained the upper hand in Indonesian politics after the failed coup in September 1965. Islamic political parties collaborated with the army to eliminate the communist groups. Under Suharto, the army, with support from the NU youth wing Ansor, conducted mass killings of the PKI leaders and its members in retribution for their alleged plotting of the coup and murder of five senior army generals (Bourchier & Hadiz 2003, p. 82). In return for their assistance the Islamic groups hoped that Suharto would allow them to play a greater role in politics. Indeed when he took office, President Suharto released many of the leaders of the Masyumi and the Indonesian Islamic League parties who were imprisoned by Sukarno. However, the Suharto government distrusted the Islamist groups and their leaders, particularly as a consequence of their involvement in revolts under Darul Islam, and their support for the PRRI/Permesta rebellion in 1950s. It was for these reasons that the new Suharto government in 1967 refused to allow the Islamists to establish new political parties, or to lift the ban imposed by Sukarno on Masyumi party (Bourchier & Hadiz 2003, p. 82). This was ultimately because he wanted the military to be the dominant political force. 

Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, Suharto’s New Order regime was concerned with the impact of the resurgence of Islam among the Indonesians especially after the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran. The government had also been critical of the involvement of the Islamic community in politics and succeeded in forcing the four Islamic political parties (including NU)​[15]​ to merge to form a single party – the United Development Party (PPP) and to adopt Pancasila, not Islam, as its fundamental ideology. Thus emasculated, these groups could no longer base their struggle on Islam. Infighting later caused a split in the PPP. NU withdrew from the PPP and divorced itself completely from the political process, concentrating instead on educational, social and religious activities.  On the foreign policy front, there was little sign of Islamic influence during the first two decades of the Suharto regime. In 1969, moved by massive demonstrations by Indonesian Muslims and Islamic political parties, Jakarta eventually condemned Israel for the burning of the Al Aqsa mosque. Nevertheless, this condemnation was wrapped as part of a collective voice from Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Even when the OIC was formed in Rabat, Morocco, in 1970 to demonstrate Islamic solidarity, Indonesia was absent. Indonesia only sent a delegation to the third OIC meeting. When the OIC drafted its Charter in 1972, Indonesia declined to seek formal membership and refused to sign it on the basis that the Republic was not an Islamic state (Sukma 2003, p.49; Banyu Perwita 2007, p. 14). Having adopted Pancasila as state ideology, Indonesia’s participation in the OIC as a permanent observer was to be based on the ‘independent and active’ principle, the 1945 Constitution and the UN Charter, not Islamic solidarity (Banyu Perwita 2007, p.15-16).

Islam and the New Order politics and foreign policy: post-Cold War era

In the post-Cold War era, Islam began to emerge as a growing force on the Indonesian political scene. This occurred when Suharto began to feel that his grip on the government and military was loosening, threatened by retired and senior military officers. As a result, he began to seek support among the Muslim masses (Sofjan 2006, p. 128). In 1990, Suharto performed hajj (or Muslim pilgrimage to Mecca) with members of his family, some cabinet ministers and friends.​[16]​ The event was televised nationally and arguably designed for political expediency, as a strategy to win the votes of Indonesian Muslims before the general election in the same year. In many of Golkar’s publications, Suharto’s new Islamic credentials began to be highlighted: for example, the usage of the title hadji, signifying that Suharto had performed hajj, and Suharto’s adoption of an Islamic name, Muhammad Suharto (Suryadinata 1997, p. 276). Various Islamic organisations had successfully lobbied the Suharto government to ban the national sports lottery; to clearly label all halal food; to lift the prohibition on women wearing hijab; to regulate Islamic marriages and to support Islamic banking and insurance (Banyu Perwita 2007, p. 22). At the same time, Suharto encouraged his Vice President, Bacharuddin Jusuf Habibie, to establish the Association of Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals (ICMI) in December 1990, which later became a mechanism for Suharto to recruit civilians into his cabinet and the People’s Representative Assembly (DPR) and provided an opportunity for Muslim intellectuals to become directly involved in politics. This clearly undermined the role of the State Secretariat that was under the influence of the Golkar party and the military (Porter 2002, p. 89). 

Under the circumstances, Islam began to gain more influence in Indonesian foreign policy in the post-Cold War era when Suharto took steps to increase the country’s international profile by pursuing a more active foreign policy. The government began to project an Islamic ‘identity’ in its international activities. In May 1991, in the wake of demands from Muslim groups, it began to take concrete actions in support of the Palestinians by donating 100 million rupiah, and 100 tonnes of rice to the PLO (Sukma 2003, p. 72). As Chairman of the NAM since September 1991, Suharto extended a warm welcome to the PLO leader, Yasser Arafat, who visited Indonesia to attend the Tenth NAM Summit the following year. Yasser Arafat, with his wife Suha, also made a one day visit to Indonesia in September 1993, when Suharto stated that ‘Indonesia is ready to offer real support to the struggle of the Palestinian people for the implementation of the pact’ (peace initiative signed between PLO and Israel earlier) (Azra 2006, p. 103). 

In the Bosnian conflict, Indonesia recognised the independence of Bosnia-Herzegovina on May 20, 1992. When the conflict escalated, Indonesian Muslim organizations, especially from the Committee for Solidarity of the Islamic World (KISDI) and the Indonesian Council of Ulama or Islamic Scholars (MUI), and political parties (most notably PPP) demanded that the government act more pro-actively in assisting the Bosnian Muslims. As a result, in July 1993 Ali Alatas (Foreign Minister during 1988-1999) declared that Indonesia was considering sending troops to Bosnia-Herzegovina under the UN peace keeping policy (Banyu Perwita 2007, p. 144). The following year, Indonesia dispatched a team of 200 medical officers to Bosnia under the UN banner. Suharto himself visited Bosnia-Herzegovina in March 1995 whilst the conflict was in full-swing. His visit was intended to rally more political support among the Indonesian Islamic community.  

Jakarta’s relations with the OIC also started to change dramatically. It sought and gained a full membership of the organization in 1990. In the following year, Suharto for the first time attended the OIC Summit in Senegal. Partly due to its growing interest in the Middle East, Indonesia was elected as Chairman of the OIC in the 1993 Summit despite the fact that the government continued to reiterate its non-religious basis (Sukma 2003, p.72). This new status facilitated Indonesia’s moves towards closer relations with countries in the Muslim World. Between 1993 and 1998, Suharto made four official visits to the Middle East.​[17]​ In 1997, Indonesia joined the D8 in order to develop closer economic and global collaboration with Muslim countries. 

Suharto’s efforts to showcase his Islamic identity did little to save him from falling in 1998 in the aftermath of the financial and economic crisis which precipitated student demonstrations and mass riots. While students from the secular elite University of Trisakti and University of Indonesia took part in the protest, most of the demonstrators came from the influential Muslim University Student Action Front (KAMMI), which represented 63 tertiary institutions, as well as state-run and private Islamic universities (Porter 2002, p. 198). In general, Islamic forces which initially supported Suharto played a significant role in his resignation. Dissatisfaction stemmed from the regime’s corruption, collusion and nepotism. When Suharto called for support from Islamic leaders after the riots they rejected him and instead began to demand his resignation. For example, Amien Rais, the leader of Muhammadiyah, the second most powerful Islamic organization and the former vice chairman of ICMI, called for more political freedom, action to end endemic corruption and ultimately the resignation of Suharto. 

Islam in Indonesian domestic politics and foreign policy: the post-Suharto era

Democratization in the post Suharto era saw the making of electoral laws allowing the establishment of new political parties. As a consequence a staggering 141 new parties were formed; 42 of which were considered Islamic political parties. Although only 20 of these so called Islamic political parties, some informal, met the requirements to participate in the 1999 general election, Islam became a rapidly growing political force during this period, and a power base for President Habibie who did not enjoy any popularity in either the Golkar party or within the military (Sukma 2003, p. 85). He continued to appoint to cabinet Muslim leaders who were members of ICMI (Latif 2008, p. 451),​[18]​ and gained support from two influential Muslim organizations: the KISDI and the Indonesian Council for Islamic Missionary Activity (DDII). These developments clearly showed that the Habibie administration ushered in an era in which Islam had become an expanding legitimate force in the politics of democratic transition. 

In the 1999 general election, the Islamic political parties, including the PPP, Crescent and Star Party (PBB) and the Justice Party (PK) and the informal ones such as National Awakening Party (PKB) and National Mandate Party (PAN), collectively managed to muster 33 percent of the seats in the DPR (Abuza 2007, pp. 22-23). The ‘formal’ Islamic political parties in Indonesia are the ones that openly declared that Islam is their political identity such as the PPP, PBB and PK while the ‘informal’ Islamic political parties are the ones that “… declare their identity as ‘open’ political parties and adopt ‘pluralism’ in their platform, but they remain dependent upon key segments in the Islamic community for support” such as the PKB and PAN (Sukma 2003, p. 95).​[19]​ More importantly, three Muslim leaders who ran in the 1999 election were elected to the highest posts. The alliance of Islamic political parties, known as the Central Axis, succeeded in lifting Abdurrahman Wahid (Gus Dur), the leader of PKB (a party he established to be the voice of NU, still the most powerful Islamic organization) to the presidency. The leader of PAN and Muhammadiyah, Amien Rais, won the election as chairman of the People’s Consultative Assembly (MPR). Furthermore, Akbar Tanjung, the former Chairman of the Muslim University Student Association (HMI), also the Chairman of Golkar party, was elected the speaker of the DPR (Azra 2006, pp. 199-200). The results in the general and presidential elections indicated that if Islamic political parties were united they could become a significant political force in the post-Suharto era. However, this unity was hard to maintain. Gus Dur remained in power for only 21 months before being impeached by the MPR and replaced by Megawati in August 2001. Apart from economic mismanagement and his apparent disregard for popular sentiment when announcing his intention to open trade relations with Israel, he also antagonized some Islamic political parties under the Central Axis coalition by sacking Hamzah Haz, a senior minister and chairman of the PPP, barely three months into his presidency, for fear that the latter would become his political competitor. The Central Axis coalition was responsible for bringing down Gus Dur and giving their support to Megawati. Her secular-nationalist government did not attempt to reduce the influence of the Islamic political parties, and as a compromise Hamzah Haz was chosen as Vice President. Nevertheless, co-operation between the secular-nationalists and Islamists was short-lived, as the latter (especially PPP and PBB) came to demand the inclusion of the 1945 Jakarta Charter (concerning the introduction of syariah and the decree that only a Muslim can become President) into the Indonesian Constitution. This was unsurprisingly rejected by Megawati and other secular members in the MPR (Sukma 2003, p. 126). 

In the 2004 general election, the Islamic political parties increased their share in the DPR seats from 27.9 percent to 40.5 percent (Abuza 2007, p. 25).

Table 6  Indonesia’s parliamentary election results (1999 compared with 2004)

1999	%  votes	Seats	2004	% votes	Seats
PDI-PGolkar**PKB*PPP-**PAN*PBB*PK-Other Parties	33.722.412.610.77.11.9111	1541205139352259	PDI-PGolkar**PKB*PPPPD**PAN*PBB*PKS*PBROther Parties	18.521.610.68.27.56.42.67.32.417.3	1091285258574711451338
  Source: Abuza 2007, p. 25.
 * formal Islamic political parties 			** informal Islamic political parties

For the first popularly elected president Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY), support from the various Islamic political parties, especially PAN, PBB and PKS, was important since his Democrat Party (PD) garnered only 57 of the 558 seats in the DPR (see Table 6). SBY appointed ten cabinet ministers from those parties. Thus, his government could not afford to affront Islamic sensibilities, or be seen to be ‘left behind’ on issues regarding Islam. He went out of his way to make the general public see that he understood and respected the aspirations of ordinary Muslims. His government gave Aceh the right to introduce syariah, while the province was also granted partial autonomy as a prerequisite for a peaceful resolution to the conflict (Hosen 2007, p. 218). The special concessions provided to Aceh province are likely to bring more political demands from other provinces where Islamic political parties are in power; especially in regards to the implementation of syariah.​[20]​ 

However, the post-Suharto era has not witnessed a linear rise of Islam’s influence in the Indonesian foreign policy. Instead, the influence has fluctuated as a result of a tension faced by successive governments. On one hand, leaders needed to make concessions to the demands of Indonesian Muslims, especially in regards to taking a more active role in the Muslim world. This includes adopting a critical stand against the US and its allies for the invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as their ‘War on Terror’ in general. On the other hand, post-Suharto leaders were aware of the importance of maintaining good relations with the US and the European nations as they were the largest financial lenders to Indonesia through International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank after the 1997 crisis. Within this overarching delicate condition, different governments staged their own performances according to their interpretation of the circumstances. In 1998, the US and NATO air strikes against Iraq, Afghanistan and Sudan drew massive demonstrations and flag burning in front of the US Embassy by Muslim protesters. However, due to its desperate need for the financial life support from IMF and the World Bank, the Habibie administration failed to out-rightly condemn the air strikes, choosing instead to simply express ‘regret’. 

In contrast, the Islamic factor was more clearly and directly present in Gus Dur’s foreign policy, although there seemed to be an evident element of pragmatism and economic-self interest in the policy. He appointed Alwi Shihab, a former professor of comparative religions at Harvard University, as Foreign Minister. In addition to his strong network in the West, Alwi Shihab was known to have close contacts with Islamic and Middle Eastern countries, especially Egypt and Saudi Arabia. Gus Dur wanted to use Alwi Shihab’s connections with the wealthy Middle East countries to attract financial aid and loans. The Foreign Minister indeed secured assurance of large investments from governments and business people in Kuwait and Qatar (Sukma 2003, p. 110). However, Gus Dur’s idiosyncratic calculation to chase a complementary relationship between seeking economic assistance and consolidating Islamic solidarity took what many of his colleagues criticized as a bizarre turn. The idea of opening trade relations with Israel was the most controversial of foreign policy decisions made by the Gus Dur administration. The arguments given by Gus Dur were: firstly, it would attract the Jewish business people in Israel and US to invest in Indonesia; secondly, Indonesia could use the relationship to play a role in solving the Palestinian problem (in fact Yasser Arafat was assured that Indonesia would not neglect the Palestinian people, even if it opened relations with Israel); thirdly, in the religious context, during Prophet Muhammad’s period, trade with the Jews was allowed. Finally, the Jewish lobby might assist Indonesia to prevent the United Nations Commission on Human Rights (UNHCR) from prosecuting the Indonesian military in East Timor at the International Tribunal for War Crime (Sukma 2003, p.110, pp. 112-113). Nevertheless, Gus Dur’s trade proposal received harsh criticism from the Muslim community. In the end, the strong Muslim protest, led by the Islamic political parties, Muslim organizations (especially the student organization KAMMI) and religious leaders (notably from the NU), forced Gus Dur to postpone his planned trade relations with Israel. Regardless of whether he could convince himself of the feasibility of this ‘one stone multiple birds’ idea, his contradictory policy of supporting the Islamic cause whilst extending diplomatic support to Israel had both angered and confused Muslim voters. Eventually the same Islamic political parties that helped bring Gus Dur to power also became the force that brought him down; primarily because they were disenchanted with both his administration’s foreign policy as well as general incompetence. 

The Megawati Sukarnoputeri (Megawati) administration positioned ASEAN once again as the cornerstone of Indonesia’s foreign policy, but also focused on greater co-operation with Japan, US and Europe, driven mainly by economic concerns. Relations with Middle Eastern and Islamic countries were largely ignored. However, the influence of Islam was not totally absent, since Megawati replaced Gus Dur partly based on the support from Islamic political parties. Thus, she had to balance the interests of the Islamists and the secularists. Megawati visited the US one week after the September 11, 2001 attacks, to offer condolences and to show her support for George Bush’s ‘War on Terror’. This support, from the leader of the world’s most populous Muslim country, was much appreciated by the US for its symbolism. In quid pro quo, the US reciprocated in the form of financial aid amounting to US$657.7 million, in addition to the resumption of military ties and aid that ceased after the 1991 Dili massacre (Sukma 2003, p. 132). However, radical Muslim groups argued that Megawati had surrendered to pressure from the US. Vice President, Hamzah Haz, from the Islamic political party PPP, condemned the US for what he saw as its attempt to discredit the entire Muslim world by blaming the September 11, 2001 incident on Al Qaeda and naming some Muslim countries such as Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya and Syria for harboring terrorist activities. When the US and its allies were planning to attack Afghanistan, Indonesian Muslims, especially from the Islamic political parties and organizations, staged a series of anti-American and anti-war demonstrations. Radical Muslim groups such as the Islamic Defenders Front and Laskar Jihad, threatened to attack American interests in Indonesia if Afghanistan was invaded. They also claimed they would recruit Indonesian Muslim volunteers to be sent to Afghanistan for jihad. Even MUI, the highest body of Indonesian Muslim clerics, called for jihad if the US and its allies attacked Afghanistan or became hostile towards the Muslim world (Azra 2006, pp. 59-61). When the US-led Coalition of the Willing finally did attack Afghanistan and Iraq, the Megawati administration was forced to take a public stand against the invasion to appease her Islamist constituents.​[21]​  Despite this, it refused to cut diplomatic ties with the US as demanded by some Muslim groups, especially MUI, because it did not want to jeopardize the regime’s fundamental political and economic interests. 

The Megawati administration’s modest and often lackluster support for the Islamic ‘cause’ in foreign policy frustrated some of Indonesia’s extremist Muslim groups, such as JI, perhaps even triggering the terrorist attacks in Bali and Jakarta. From JI’s point of view, violent acts against the citizens and interests of the US and its Western allies in Indonesia were a justifiable way to show their opposition not only to the foreign policy taken by the US and its allies, but also to the Megawati administration. Thus if Malaysia’s long-standing efforts to champion the global Islamic cause partly explained the country’s attractiveness to potential and real militants, Jakarta’s perceived lukewarm stance in the Muslim world similarly mobilized radicals. Bombings in tourist locations in Kuta, Bali, on October 12, 2002, killed 202 people and injured more than 300, including many foreign tourists (88 Australians and 6 Americans were killed). The high profile terrorist incidents in Indonesia had caused grave international concern. The Megawati government’s delay in acting against the perpetrators in the case of Bali again reflected Jakarta’s dilemma, because there was a concern not to be seen to blame or provoke Muslim groups, as Megawati herself viewed Muslim support as an essential part of her political legitimacy (Banyu Perwita 2007, p. 163). This dilemma was exacerbated by a wide spread suspicion in the community that the bombings might have been the work of foreigners or conspirators led by CIA in an attempt to smear the image of Islam in Indonesia (Smith Kipp 2004, p. 62). 

However, when an attempt to assassinate her was made by the militant JI, the Megawati government began to take the issue of terrorism more seriously. It was revealed that JI and its leader, Abu Bakar Basyir, had educated some of the bombing suspects. Basyir was put on trial in April 2003 for treason and instigating terror and later sent to jail for four years for sedition (Smith Kipp 2004, p. 63). However, terror incidents kept happening. In August that year, a car bomb exploded near the J.W. Marriott Hotel in Jakarta, killing 5 people and injuring 150 mostly Indonesians.​[22]​ Another car bomb exploded outside the Australian Embassy in Jakarta in September 2004, resulting in the death of 9 people and injuring 200 people. Consequently, the Indonesian government finally took strong actions to prevent terrorism. The mounting pressure from the foreign countries whose citizens had been killed or injured led Megawati to issue immediately two new laws, both of which by-passed normal parliamentary process, that gave greater power to the police to arrest and detain those suspected of carrying out terrorist activities, and allowed for prosecution of those who were responsible for the bombings in Kuta, Bali (McIntyre 2005, p. 247). There was, however, a growing concern among Indonesians that these laws might be misused. For example, instead of combating terrorism, these laws might be used to suppress separatist movements in Aceh and Irian Jaya. In fact, six months after the Indonesian parliament finally approved the two new laws, Foreign Minister Hassan Wirayuda classified the Free Papua Movement (OPM) as a terrorist organization. The then Coordinating Minister for Political and Security Affairs, SBY, also accused GAM of carrying out ‘terrorist activities’ in Aceh. Defense Minister Matori Abdul Djalil even suggested that Indonesia adopt legislation similar to the draconian Internal Security Act (ISA) used in Malaysia and Singapore (McIntyre 2005, p. 247). In the age of global terrorism, the real or potential abuse of those anti-terror laws did not cause obstacles to Jakarta’s cooperation with the Western governments. After all, most Western governments implemented similar types of preventive measures allowing their police authorities to charge and imprison suspected terrorists.

The Islamic factor became more pronounced in the SBY administration’s foreign policy, reflecting his reliance on the support from Islamic political forces as mentioned earlier. The visit SBY made to Cairo in November 2004, in order to extend his condolences on the death of Yasser Arafat, was interpreted as an early example. SBY expressed Indonesia’s continual support for the struggle of the PLO and linked the Palestinian issue with the broader Islamic issues. He used his visit to Cairo to show his solidarity with the world’s Muslim community. When he met with President George Bush in the same year, SBY raised the Palestinian issue, requesting that President George Bush restart the Middle East peace process with the ultimate goal of realizing an independent Palestinian state. SBY was critical of the conflict in the Middle East, strongly opposing Israel’s air strikes at the time on Hezbollah in southern Lebanon and on the Hamas-controlled areas in the West Bank. His stance against Israel created tension between Indonesia and the US, at a time when the Bush government had recommenced military co-operation with Indonesia. While the Western financial assistance was important, the SBY administration also sought greater economic cooperation with the Muslim countries. For example, in May 2006, Indonesia hosted the D8 summit in Bali. The meeting agreed to enhance economic cooperation between states and private companies. Moreover, at the Third World Islamic Economic Forum in 2007, SBY declared that Islamic countries should use their energy resources and commodities to achieve a fair exchange of knowledge and technology from the US and Europe. He also encouraged a greater flow of trade and investment between Muslim countries by relaxing trade barriers (Loong Meng Yee 2007). In December 2008, the SBY administration condemned Israeli military actions on Gaza which killed a few hundred Palestinians. SBY himself announced that Indonesia would contribute US$1 million dollar to help the Palestinians in Gaza. He was re-elected president for the second term in October 2009.

The role of Islam in Malaysia-Indonesia relations

The different ways in which government leaders in Malaysia and Indonesia viewed the political role of religion had a profound impact on the place of Islam in bilateral relations. During Sukarno and the first two decades of the Suharto administration, Islam was thought to constitute a threat to their regimes. Consequently, Indonesia limited its participation in the affairs of the Muslim world. In contrast, Islam was made prominent in the Malaysian Constitution and became influential in domestic politics. Furthermore, Tunku was instrumental in the establishment of OIC, whilst Razak was an active participant in its activities. Because of these differences, Islam rarely featured in bilateral relations, and there was little cooperation, let alone effort to reach a united stand, on the world events effecting Muslims. In fact, the act of Confrontation was perceived by the Malaysian government to be ‘unIslamic’ because it violated what was believed to be a Quranic injunction that there are no imperialistic tendencies in Islam (Wan Abdul Latif 2004, p. 219). When the Al Aqsa Mosque was set ablaze in 1969, condemnation of Israel was done not as one voice between Malaysian and Indonesian governments. There were just a few bilateral contacts boasting some Islamic contents. For example, Indonesia had always participated in the international Koran recital competition organized by Malaya/Malaysia since 1961 (except during 1963-1965). Indonesia sent officers to study the Malaysian government’s successful Hajj Fund (Tabung Haji) which was devised to facilitate and provide services to the people who wanted to perform hajj in Mecca. Malaysia allowed Indonesian ulama (religious teachers) to preach in Malaysia, which eventually led to extremists such as Abu Bakar Basyir and Abdullah Sungkar setting up JI in Malaysia. 

The September 11, 2001 event did not instantly bring about a united front between Kuala Lumpur and Jakarta on regional security. Prior to the event, the issue of terrorism was not a high priority on the foreign policy agendas of either Malaysia or Indonesia, simply because terrorism was seen as a problem of the Middle East. In fact Indonesia did not see Bush’s concept of ‘War on Terror’ as relevant to itself before the Bali bombings. For its part the Malaysian authorities didn’t take action when representatives of regional militant groups met in Kuala Lumpur in 1999 to discuss the formation of the Mujahedeen Coalition. September 11, 2001 event was the wake-up call alerting Malaysia (but apparently not Indonesia) that international terrorist groups, such as Al-Qaeda, had networks in the country and the region. Cooperation between the two governments in combating terrorism was limited because Jakarta denied that terrorist groups were operating on Indonesian soil, let alone having involvement with the Al-Qaeda global network. Malaysia had repeatedly requested that the Indonesian government take action to arrest suspected terrorists believed to be operating in Indonesia, but to no avail. When the JI network was first uncovered in Malaysia in early 2002, the Indonesian authorities failed to identify it as a terrorist organization and be convinced that Abu Bakar Basyir was involved with JI. To the disappointment of the Malaysian government, Basyir was called in by the Indonesian police but was later released (Abuza 2003, p. 194). It also saw Basyir’s eventual sentencing as too lenient (Emmers & Sebastian 2005, p. 159). In fact for several years Jakarta persistently denied JI’s existence in Indonesia itself.

Since Abdullah and SBY became leaders, the two governments sought close cooperation and consultation with regard to the affairs of the Muslim world, working together at forums like the D8 to craft resolutions on various issues including the Palestinian cause and transnational terrorism. A more preeminent issue in the bilateral agenda was the cross-border terrorist threat both faced at home. SBY and Abdullah understood that terrorism had the potential to threaten the stability of their societies by creating havoc in the ethnic and religious balance, and sending a negative message to potential foreign investors, tourists and the West in general. Importance of cooperation in the fight against terrorism was also reinforced by the fact that terrorist organisations often shared intelligence, resources and conducted joint operations across national borders.  Indonesia believed that JI had received funding from Malaysia. Moreover, two of the most wanted persons engaging in terrorism in Indonesia, Dr Azhari and Nordin Mat Top, were Malaysian citizens.





The religion of Islam has played different roles in the foreign policies of Malaysia and Indonesia, largely due to variations of the influence of political Islam in their respective national politics. In the case of Indonesia, the Javanese dominant ruling elites all along, are mostly secular nationalists and liberal Muslims. Furthermore, they made a historic choice of Pancasila as the guiding ideology for nation-building. Islam did not feature prominently in foreign policy during Sukarno’s presidency and the first two decades of the Suharto administration. However, the influence of Islam in domestic politics grew significantly from the later years of the New Order regime. This development, in conjunction with global events concerning Muslim societies in the world, particularly the US-led campaign against terrorism, ensured that Islam started to frame the issues and approaches in Indonesia’s foreign policy. At the same time, however, Jakarta must carefully balance its Islamic credentials with its need for Western financial and economic assistance, hence the fluctuation of the profile of Islam in the post-Suharto foreign policy. 

In Malaysia, Islam has had a more pervasive influence in domestic politics since independence. This is not just because the Malay-Muslims have monopolised political power in an ethnicity-defined political system but also due to Islam’s status as the constitutionally enshrined ‘official religion’ of the state. This guarantees the legal right to pursue Islamic agendas in the country’s political life ever since independence. While the government and UMNO have continued to promote modernist views of Islam in order to produce ‘progressive Muslims’, culminating in Abdullah’s concept of Islam Hadhari, pandering to the more conservative Islamic forces has also been politically necessary under many circumstances – hence Mahathir’s declaration that Malaysia was an ‘Islamic state’. On the front of foreign policy, Malaysia has always pursued active engagement with the Muslim world, regularly demonstrating a spirit of Islamic solidarity on issues affecting Muslim societies, and more so in the post-September 11 international relations. 
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^1	  The Malaysian syariah law however does include offences such as alcohol consumption. Most offenders are fined but in a rare incident, a female part-time model, Kartika Sari Dewi Shukarno was sentenced by a strict syariah judge in the state of Pahang to be caned six times and fined $5,000 ringgit for consuming alcohol. The decision of the syariah judge was considered ‘harsh’ and later overruled by Sultan Ahmad Shah of Pahang (as the head of the state of Pahang and the head of Islamic religion) who ordered the female model to do three weeks of community service at the Tengku Ampuan Fatimah Childrean’s Home in Kuantan (Habibu & Husin 2010).  
^2	   Prophet Muhammad is believed to have made the journey to heaven from the mosque and returned to earth from there. It is the third holiest place for Muslims behind Mecca and Medina.
^3	     See Juo-Yu Lin (2002) for further analysis of the 1999 general election.
^4	    In 1999 Anwar was found guilty of corruption and imprisoned for six years. In August 2000, after a second trial, he was also found guilty of sodomy and received a nine year imprisonment for that.
^5	  For the controversy over whether Malaysia, a secular state with Islam as its ‘official religion’, is an Islamic state, see Khoo Boo Teik (2003, p. 184). 
^6	  Up to this point, Malaysia has not yet opened diplomatic relations with Israel, and Malaysians are not allowed to travel to Israel and vice versa. 
^7	   Serumpun refers to the similar stock or race and blood brotherhood.
^8	  Dr Azhari Husin held a PhD in statistics from the University of Reading in Britain. He joined JI when he was a lecturer at the Universiti Teknologi Malaysia. He was popularly known as “Dr Bomb” due to his involvement in making bombs for the Bali, J. W. Marriot and the Australian Embassy incidents. Dr Azhari was killed in a shoot-out with Indonesian police on November 2005 in the hill town of Batu, East Java while Nordin Mat Top managed to escape but was eventually shot dead by police in an ambush in central Java in 2009. 
^9	   Some scholars do not consider GAM as a militant group since GAM was opposed by two militant Islamic groups in Aceh, namely Laskar Jihad and Front Pembela Islam which were supported by the Indonesian Army (TNI). Nevertheless, GAM did participate with other militant Islamic groups such as KMM, Laskar Jundullah and MILF in the region to establish the Mujahidin Coalition in 1999. At the same time, the then Coordinating Minister for Political and Security Affairs, SBY, during the Megawati administration, had accused GAM of carrying out ‘terrorist activities’ in Aceh. 
^10	   Jihad literally means ‘struggle’, ‘effort’ and ‘exertion’. There are basically two types of jihad: the greater jihad or personal, spiritual struggle; and lesser jihad, or the warfare form of struggle often known in recent history as the holy war (Saikal 2003, p. 26).  
^11	  Islamic political parties are political parties that promote Islam as a political movement and fill candidates in a democratic election accordingly.
^12	   The members of the ‘Committee of Nine’ were Sukarno, Hatta, Maramis, Abikoesno Tjokrosedjoso, Abdul Kahar Muzakkir, Agus Salim, Ahmad Soebardjo, Abdul Wahid Hasjim (Wahid Hasyim) and Muhammad Yamin.
^13	   See Elson’s article entitled “Another look at the Jakarta Charter Controversy of 1945” for further information on the role of the leaders of both Muhammadiyah and NU in drafting the so- called Jakarta Charter of 1945.
^14	   This stands for Nasionalisme, Agama dan Komunisme (or Nationalism, Religion and Communism). Under NASAKOM, nationalism was represented by the Indonesian National Party (PNI) and the army, religion by the Masyumi Party, and communism by the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI).
^15	   The other three were the Muslim Party of Indonesia (PMI), the Islamic Association Party of Indonesia (PSII), and the Islamic Educational Movement (Perti). 
^16	   Those who joined him included his brother-in-law Maj. Gen. Wismoyo Arismundar, his son-in-law Colonel Prabowo Subianto, Indonesian Armed Forces Chief Try Sutrisno, and close business friend Bob Hasan (Porter 2002, p. 88). 
^17	    Suharto visited Tunisia and Iran in November 1993, and Jordan in 1996. In 1997 he travelled to Turkey to attend the D8 meeting of Developing Muslim countries. In 1998 he visited Egypt. 
^18	    Among the ICMI members elevated to cabinet posts were Adi Sasono, A. M. Saefuddin, Fahmi Idris, Marzuki Usman, Soleh Solahuddin and Tuty Alawiyah.
^19	  Abuza the author of Political Islam and Violence in Indonesia (2007) is not the only author that differentiates between the ‘formal’ and ‘informal’ Islamic political parties. Sukma, the author of Islam in Indonesian Foreign Policy (2003), makes the same point. 
^20	    Strong pressure for the implementation of the syariah laws is demonstrated from a survey conducted in 2001 by the Centre for the Study of Islam and Society at the Syarif Hidayatullah Islamic Institute in Jakarta. The survey covered 16 provinces and found out that 61.4 percent of respondents wanted the government to enforce syariah for Muslims. In the survey, 42.4 percent of the respondents favoured stoning to death for adulterers, and 28.9 percent amputation for thieves. In 2004, the Centre conducted another survey specifically about the syariah and found that stoning to death for adulterers had risen to 55 percent, and 40 percent amputation for thieves (Crouch 2005, pp. 36-37).  
^21	   Joyce Juo-Yu Lin (2005, pp. 62) rightly points out that growing anti-American and anti-war sentiments helped to fuel the rise of a more radical form of political Islam in countries like Indonesia and Malaysia, with Islamic opposition parties and organizations exerting tremendous pressures on their governments to more strongly condemn Washington, London and Canberra. 
^22	  A few days after the J.W. Marriott Hotel bombing, the JI operational director in Southeast Asia, Riduan Isamuddin (alias Hambali), an Indonesian citizen born in West Java, was captured in Ayutthaya, Thailand. During interrogation, he confessed to plotting to bomb several foreign embassies, as well as other important locations, during the forthcoming Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) meeting in Bangkok. 
